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 In certain applications, fingerprint authentication systems require templates 
to be stored in databases. The possible leakage of these fingerprint templates 
can lead to serious security and privacy threats. Therefore, with the frequent 
use of fingerprint authentication on mobile devices, it has become 
increasingly important to keep fingerprint data safe. Due to rapid 
developments in optical equipment, biometric systems are now able to gain 
the same biometric images repeatedly, so strong features can be selected with 
precision. Strong features refer to high-quality features which can be easily 
distinguished from other features in biometric raw images. In this paper, we 
introduce an algorithm that identifies these strong features with certain 
probability from a given fingerprint image. Once values are extracted from 
these features, they are used as the authentication data. Using the geometric 
information of these strong features, a cancelable fingerprint template can be 
produced, and the process of extracting values and geometric information is 
further explained. Because this is a light-weight authentication scheme, this 
template has practical usage for low performance mobile devices. Finally, we 
demonstrate that our proposed schemes are secure and that the user’s 
biometric raw data of the fingerprint are safe, even when the mobile device is 
lost or stolen.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The fingerprint authentication system is now widely considered to be a convenient human 
identification method for mobile devices [1]. In the near future, one mobile device will have one or more 
biometric templates such as fingerprint templates and this calls for higher security measures to keep the data 
safe. A fingerprint authentication system consists of an application and its template stored in a database. The 
leakage of these fingerprint templates entails serious security and privacy threats. 
In this paper, we propose secure and efficient fingerprint authentication schemes which are designed 
to suit mobile devices, and explain the process of producing cancelable fingerprint templates that protect the 
user’s privacy. Our suggestion is based on the assumption that the fingerprint samples are of robust quality, 
neither partial nor wet, with good condition images. Since the user has enough time to authenticate his own 
fingerprint through multiple trials, this assumption is reasonable. Strong features from the fingerprints are 
used for this scheme. Strong features refer to high-quality features which can be distinguished easily from 
other features in biometric raw images [2]. Through our (w-k) Select algorithm we will show that strong 
features can be found with certain probability. We extract values from the features and their geometric 
information. The proposed cancelable fingerprint template is composed of these values and geometric 
information extracted from these features. The proposed schemes are produced using this template. 
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Geometric hashing [3] is a method for finding two-dimensional objects. We use this method to extract 
coordinates (x, y) values of the strong features. 
Section 2 contains a discussion of previous work related to secure authentication systems using 
biometrics. Section 3 describes the process of selecting strong features from fingerprint images and 
generating cancelable fingerprint templates. In section 4, we then propose our schemes in which the hash 
values of features are used as verification information by the authentication system. Because our proposed 
schemes are light-weight and efficient, they suit low performance mobile devices. In section 5, we 
demonstrate that our proposed schemes based on one-time password (OTP) are secure, and the user’s 
biometric data of fingerprints are also safe, even when the mobile device is lost or stolen. Finally, 
conclusions are discussed in section 6. 
 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
Since the introduction of outstanding concepts such as fuzzy commitment [4] and fuzzy vault [5] 
schemes, which locks biometric data for safety, there have been studies on how to protect biometric 
templates by using robust hash functions [6, 7]. To generate cancelable fingerprint templates Ratha et al. 
proposed a hard-to-invert transformation [8, 9]. By carefully selecting strong features that are easier for a 
specific user to replicate, Randomized Biometric Templates (RBTs) [2] have also been proposed, creating a 
difficult environment for attackers to make guesses. Biometric key extraction is a method to get fixed binary 
from biometric templates. Many studies have also suggested methods of making cryptographic keys from 
various biometrics. Iris [10, 11], face [12] and  finger vein [13] are some examples. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Selecting strong features and geometric hashing of the features 
 
 
Algorithm 1. Specification of the (w-k)Select algorithm 
Input: fingerprint samples (β1,…,βw), w, k 
Output:the strong features F 
1: ki = 0 (i=1,…,N) // N is the number of all featuresof original fingerprint β 
2: forj ← 1 towdo{ 
3:     (f1,...,fN)←Find(βj) //Find fingerprint features 
4:     fori ← 1 toNdo{ 
5:          iffi exists thenki++ 
6:     } 
7: }     
8: F ← fi has ki such that ki ≥ k 
9: returnF 
 
 
3. GENERATION OF TEMPLATE 
 
3.1. Strong Features of Fingerprint 
It is widely known that biometric data cannot be precisely reproduced each time it is measured. 
When a biometric system uses these data, it has to solve the problem of error tolerance. However, due to the 
development of optical equipment, the biometric systems are now able to repeatedly obtain almost the same 
biometric images. Strong features are high-quality features which can be distinguished easily from other 
features in biometric raw images. Using an error correction method like quantization [2], we can arrive at the 
same and repeatable values from the strong features. An example of selecting five strong features in a 
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fingerprint image is shown in Figure 1. Strong features of certain probability are results of the proposed (w-
k)Select algorithm which is shown in Algorithm 1. If some strong features of 100 percent probability are 
found, they can be used as cryptographic keys.  Here, w is the number of input fingerprint images and k is the 
minimum number of trials to find the features. We say F is the set of (w-k) strong features. When ϕ = 
(k/w)*100, we can say F is the set of (ϕ%) strong features. 
 
3.2. Generating Fingerprint Template with Strong Features 
After enrollment pre-processing phase which consists of one-pixel-width thinning stage and 
positioning stage with an enrolled fingerprint image, we can select features, called as minutiae, as shown in 
Figure 1 and extract valid minutiae values. A minutia can be specified by its coordinates (x, y), angle (θ), and 
its type (t) which is ending or bifurcation, such as mi = (xi, yi, θi, ti) [14]. To apply error correction to minutiae 
mi, each minutia should be quantized to the ranges of values, where xi and yi may have 16 ranges (0-15), θi 32 
ranges (0-31), and ti 4 ranges (0-3), respectively. An example of geometric hashing with five minutiae is 
shown in Figure 1. With this method, we can extract minutiae information from strong features. Table 1 
shows hash table of vector 
4 1P P
  which has x, y coordinates of Figure 1’s five minutiae with basis (4,1). If 
other hash tables for the strong features are needed, hash table of vector 
4 2P P
  or vector 
4 3P P
  can be made, 
respectively. 
The geometric information of five minutiae is shown in Figure 2, which are distances (d1,d2,d3,d4) 
and angles (a1,a2,a3,a4) between strong features (F1,F2,F3,F4,F5). Our fingerprint template is composed of 
geometric information and minutiae values of strong features. In the verification phase, geometric 
information is provided for the alignment of input fingerprint in searching for strong features. Let n be a 
number of strong features. Geometric information G is as shown below  
G = (d1,…,dn-1, a1,…,an-1). 
Minutiae values are actual authentication data that is used in user verification. Original minutiae 
values M is as shown below 
M = (m1,…,mn). 
Finally, our fingerprint template is as follows 
FingTemp = (G || M).( ||  : binary concatenation) 
In order to check security functions, we will randomize minutiae values and insert them into the 
template. Randomizing minutiae information will be explained in section 4. 
 
 
Table 1. Hash table of strong features with basis (4,1) 
x y basis point 
0.5 0 (4,1)    1 
1.4 -0.25 (4,1)    2 
0.4 
-0.5 
0.4 
0.8 
0 
-1.3 
(4,1) 
(4,1) 
(4,1) 
   3 
   4 
   5 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Distances and angles between strong features 
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4. OUR CONSTRUCTION 
We have proposed one basic scheme and two extended schemes. In scheme 1, we simply use 
FingTemp and random number r. In scheme 2, we use FingTemp, r, and user’s password π to increase 
security and in scheme 3, we consider the case of losing one of n strong features. We assume that with error 
correction such as simple quantization, we can obtain the (100%) strong features of the same user in our 
schemes. 
 
4.1. Scheme 1 
As explained above, let FingTemp = (G || M) be the original fingerprint template given from the raw 
image.  
Enrollment: Given a security parameter k, let p be a prime number. The enrollment algorithm 
chooses a random number r∈Zp* and hash functions H1 : {0,1}*→Zp*, and H2 : Zp*→{0,1}k. 
1) Compute M of FingTemp, Mh1=H1(M). 
2) Compute M’ = Mh1⊕r.(⊕ : bitwise exclusive-or, XOR) 
3) Compute rh2 = H2(r).  
Later, rh2 will be used as verification information. Randomized minutiae M’ is taken to make a 
cancelable fingerprint template. Our cancelable fingerprint template is as follows 
CanFingTemp = (G || M’). 
If a user’s ID is necessary for authentication in the device, ID, CanFingTemp and rh2 are stored in a 
database as follows 
DB record: {ID, (G || M’), rh2}. 
Verification: With the use of the input biometric template which is obtained by a fingerprint 
scanner, someone’s minutiae values β is provided to the verification algorithm. Geometric information G is 
used to find exact position of the minutiae. 
1) Compute βh1 = H1(β). 
2) Compute β’ = βh1⊕M’. 
3) Compute (β’)h2 = H2(β’ ). 
4) If (β’)h2 = rh2 then output “Yes” which indicates that the user is authentic, or “No” which 
means that the user is not. 
 
4.2. Scheme 2 
Let π be the user’s password. For a more secure verification process we use the user’s fingerprint 
template and password, that is to say a two-factor authentication.  
Enrollment: Given a security parameter k, let p be a prime number. The enrollment algorithm 
chooses a random number r∈Zp* and hash functions H1 : {0,1}*→Zp*, and H2 : Zp*→{0,1}k. 
1) Compute M of FingTemp, Mh1=H1(M) 
2) Compute πh1 = H1(π). 
3) Compute M’ = Mh1⊕r. 
4) Compute M’’ = M’⊕πh1 
5) Compute rh2 = H2(r). 
Later, rh2 will be used as verification information. Randomized minutiae M’’ is taken to make a 
cancelable fingerprint template. Now, our fingerprint template is as follows 
CanFingTemp = (G || M’’). 
If the user’s ID is necessary for authentication in the device, ID, CanFingTemp and rh2 are stored in 
a database as follows 
DB record: {ID, (G || M’’), rh2}. 
Verification: With the use of the input biometric template which is obtained by a fingerprint 
scanner, someone’s minutiae values β and also his password ߤ are provided to the verification algorithm. 
Geometric information G is used to find the exact position of the minutiae. 
1) Compute βh1 = H1(β). 
2) Compute ߤh1 = H1(ߤ). 
3) Compute β’ = βh1⊕M’’. 
4) Compute β’’ = β’⊕ߤh1. 
5) Compute (β’’)h2 = H2(β’’). 
6) If (β’’)h2 = rh2 then output “Yes” which indicates that the user is authentic, or “No” which 
means that the user is not.  
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4.3. Scheme 3 
As explained above, let FingTemp = (G || M) be the original fingerprint template given from the raw 
image. Here we consider the case of losing one of n strong features. We make FingTemp(-1), … , FingTemp(-n) 
such that FingTemp(-i)= (G || M(-i)) and M(-i) = M - mi.  
Enrollment: Given a security parameter k, let p be a prime number. The enrollment algorithm 
chooses random numbers r∈Zp* and (r(-1), … r(-n))∈Zp*, two hash functions H1 : {0,1}*→Zp*, and H2 : 
Zp*→{0,1}k. 
1) Compute M of FingTemp, Mh1=H1(M). 
Compute M(-1)h1=H1(M(-1)). 
… 
Compute M(-n)h1=H1(M(-n)). 
2) Compute M’ = Mh1⊕r. 
Compute M’(-1) =  M(-1)h1⊕r(-1). 
… 
Compute M’(-n) =  M(-n)h1⊕r(-n). 
3) Compute rh2 = H2(r).  
Compute r(-1)h2 = H2(r(-1)).  
… 
Compute r(-n)h2 = H2(r(-n)). 
Later, rh2, r(-1)h2 , … ,r(-n)h2 will be used as verification information. Randomized minutiae M’,M’(-
1),…,M’(-n) are used in order to make cancelable fingerprint templates. Our cancelable fingerprint templates 
are as follows 
CanFingTemp = (G || M’). 
CanFingTemp(-1) = (G || M’(-1)). 
… 
CanFingTemp(-n) = (G || M’(-n)). 
If a user’s ID is necessary for authentication in the device, ID, rh2, r(-1)h2,…,r(-n)h2, and our cancelable 
fingerprint templates are stored in a database as follows 
DB record: {ID, (G || M’), rh2 }. 
{ID, (G || M’(-1)), r(-1)h2 }. 
… 
{ID, (G || M’(-n)), r(-n)h2 }. 
Verification: With the use of the input biometric template which is obtained by a fingerprint 
scanner, someone’s minutiae values β is provided to the verification algorithm. Geometric information G is 
used to find the exact position of the minutiae. We assume that β has n or n-1 minutiae values. 
1) Compute βh1 = H1(β). 
2) Compute β’ = βh1⊕M’. 
Compute β’(-1) = βh1⊕M’(-1). 
 … 
Compute β’(-n) = βh1⊕M’(-n). 
3) Compute (β’)h2 = H2(β’). 
Compute (β’(-1))h2 = H2(β’(-1)) 
… 
Compute (β’(-n))h2 = H2(β’(-n)) 
4) If (β’)h2 = rh2 or (β’(-1))h2 = r(-1)h2 or … or (β’(-n))h2 = r(-n)h2 then output “Yes” which 
indicates that the user is authentic, or “No” which means that the user is not. 
 
4.4. Correctness 
In scheme 1 and 3, if M = β then the following equation is correct. 
(β’)h2  = H2(β’)  
= H2(βh1⊕M’) 
= H2(H1(β)⊕M’) 
= H2(H1(β)⊕H1(M) ⊕ r) 
= H2(r) 
= rh2. 
And in scheme 3, if M(-i) = β then the following equation is correct. 
(β’(-i))h2  = H2(β’(-i))  
= H2(βh1⊕M’(-i)) 
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= H2(H1(β)⊕M’(-i)) 
= H2(H1(β)⊕H1(M(-i))⊕r(-i)) 
= H2(r(-i)) 
= r(-i)h2. 
Finally, in scheme 2, if M = β and π = ߤ then the following equation is correct. 
(β’’)h2  = H2(β’’ ) 
= H2(β’⊕ߤh1) 
= H2(βh1⊕M’’⊕ߤh1) 
= H2(βh1⊕M’⊕πh1⊕ߤh1) 
= H2(βh1⊕M’⊕H1(π)⊕H1(ߤ)) 
= H2(βh1⊕M’) 
= H2(βh1⊕Mh1⊕r) 
= H2(H1(β )⊕H1(M)⊕r) 
= H2(r) 
= rh2. 
 
 
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section we perform security analysis of our fingerprint template and our proposed schemes. 
Security for Fingerprint Template: In the previous section we have shown the process of 
selecting strong features for the template from the original fingerprint images as an example. The proposed 
cancelable fingerprint template, CanFingTemp consists of two components, geometric information G and 
randomized minutiae M’ in scheme 1, 3 (or M’’ in scheme 2). First, we discuss security for M’ (or M’’). 
According to the error-correction quantization of mi, we assume that original one minutia information may 
have the size of 15 bits such as mi = (xi,yi,θi,ti), where at least xi and yi may have 16 relative different values 
(4bits, 0-15), θi 32 relative values (5bits, 0-31), and ti 4 values (2bits, 0-3), respectively. When the number of 
strong features n = 5, M is a 75 bit long value and in the case of n = 10, M is a 150 bit long value. The length 
of M is long enough, which makes it harder for attackers to take a guess. Randomized minutiae M’ (or M’’) is 
computed as follows. M is transformed with the one-way hash function (H1(·)) and randomized using random 
number r with XOR operation. In scheme 2, M is randomized once more using hash value of π with XOR 
operation. Random number r also is transformed with the hash function (H2(·)) and this hash value rh2 is 
stored in the device. After that, r is deleted from the device, so nobody can compute the original minutiae 
information M. 
Next, note that G is the information of relative distances (di) and angles (ai) between strong features. 
When G is compromised by an attack, the “old G” can be canceled and a new fingerprint template with “new 
G” can be enrolled, which means that other strong features will be selected for the new template. If we find 
20 strong features from the user’s fingerprint and select 10 features from among them, we can make new 
templates more than 180,000 times (combination of 20 elements choose 10). In short, our CanFingTemp is 
cancelable and it keeps the user’s fingerprint data safe. 
Security for Proposed Schemes: In our schemes, random number r is transformed with the one-
way hash function (H2(·)) and hash value rh2 (or r(-i)h2) is stored in a database as user’s verification 
information. Random number r (or r(-i)) is eliminated from the device and r (or r(-i)) cannot be restored from 
the hash value rh2 (or r(-i)h2). Each time user’s enrollment is implemented, random r (or r(-i)) is a different 
value which is then used to transform minutiae information M differently. In short, random r (or r(-i)) is used 
as a one-time password (OTP) in our schemes which adds a high level of security to the proposed 
authentication schemes. We can say that our authentication schemes based on one-time passwords are secure. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we propose a cancelable fingerprint template which uses high quality and easily 
distinguishable features. The proposed algorithm, (w-k)Select outputs strong features of certain probability. 
Because we only use partial features of fingerprints, even when partial information is lost, the user’s 
fingerprint data is safe. Our cancelable template is composed of geometric information G which is the 
relative value of distances and angles between strong features and randomized minutiae M’ of strong 
features. With this cancelable fingerprint template and random number r (and user’s password π), it is evident 
that our scheme is secure. Our schemes perform only bitwise XOR operations in enrollment and verification 
phases, which means they are light-weight schemes which are well suited for low performance mobile 
devices. We believe that our schemes are useful for both the protection of fingerprint data and human 
authentication on mobile devices. 
 
                ISSN: 2088-8708 
IJECE Vol. 5, No. 3, June 2015 :  579 – 585 
585
REFERENCES 
[1] Apple Inc. Apple Online Store, “iPhone6 Touch ID, at http://www.apple.com/iphone-6/touch-id/,” 2015. 
[2] L. Ballard, S. Kamara, F. Monrose, and M. Reiter, “Towards Practical Biometric Key Generation with Randomized 
Biometric Templates”, CCS’08, October 27-31, 2008, Alexandria, Virginia, USA, 2008. 
[3] H. Wolfson and I. Rigoutsos, “Geometric Hashing: An Overview”, IEEE Computational Science and Engineering, 
4(4), pp. 10-21, 1997. 
[4] A. Juels and M. Wattenberg, “A fuzzy commitment scheme”, in Proc. ACM Conf. on Computer and 
Communications Security, pp. 28-36, 1999. 
[5] A. Juels and M. Sudan, “A fuzzy vault scheme”, in IEEE Intl. Symp. On Information Theory, 2002. 
[6] T. Connie, A. Teoh, M. Goh, and D. Ngo, “Palmhashing: a novel approach for cancelable biometrics”, Information 
Processing Letters, Vol 93, pp. 614-634, 2005. 
[7] Y. Sutcu, T. Sencar, and N. Memon, “A secure biometric authentication scheme based on robust hashing”, In ACM 
MMSEC Workshop, 2005. 
[8] N. Ratha, J. Connell, and R. Bolle, and S. Chikkerur, “Cancelable biometrics: A case study in fingerprints”, In Intl. 
Conf. on Pattern Recognition, pp. 370-373, 2006. 
[9] N. Ratha, S. Chikkerur, J. Connell, and R. Bolle, “Generating cancelable fingerprint templates”, IEEE Transactions 
on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, Vol 29. No.4, pp. 561-172, 2007. 
[10] Y.J. Lee, H.G. Lee, K.R. Park, and J. Kim, “Invariant biometric key extraction based on iris code”, Proc. of IEEK 
Fall Conf., Seoul, Korea, vol. 28, no. 2, 2005. 
[11] F. Hao, R. Anderson, and J. Daugman, “Combining crypto with biometrics effectively”, IEEE Transactions on 
Computers, vol. 55, no. 9, pp. 1081-1088, 2006. 
[12] A. Gohand D.C.L. Ngo, “Computation of cryptographic keys from face biometrics”, International Federation for 
Information Processing 2003, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2828, pp. 1–13, 2003. 
[13] A. Venckauskas and P. Nanevicius, “Cryptographic Key Generation from Finger Vein”, International Journal of 
Engineering Sciences and Research Technology. 2(4), pp. 733–738, 2013. 
[14] D. Moon, et al., “Fingerprint Template Protection using Fuzzy Vault”, LNCS 4707, pp. 1141-1151, 2007. 
 
 
BIOGRAPHY OF AUTHOR 
 
 
Jinho Han was born in Seoul, Korea on April 5th, 1965; He received the B.A. degree in the 
Department of Forestry from Korea University and M.E. degree in the Department of Network 
Management at Dongguk University, Seoul, Korea, in 1990 and 2006, respectively. He received 
the Ph.D. degree at the Graduate School of Information Security from Korea University in 2013. 
He is currently anassistant professor in the department of Liberal studies (computer) at Korean 
Bible University, Seoul, Korea. His research areas include broadcast encryption, attribute-based 
encryption, and biometrics. 
 
